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TESTING THE STRENGTH OF THE IRON CAGE: A META-ANALYSIS OF 
NEO-INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we use meta-analytical techniques to quantitatively synthesize and 
evaluate the sizeable body of empirical work that has been conducted under the 
banner of neo-institutional theory. We find strong support for the influence of 
mimetic pressures on organizational isomorphism, but support for the predicted roles 
of normative and coercive factors is mixed. Similarly, we find that the strategic 
isomorphism, the homogenous application of corporate policies, tends to translate into 
symbolic but not substantive performance effects. In combination with additional 
moderator analyses, these findings suggest new directions for future research. 
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Over the past three decades, neo-institutional theory has become the dominant 
approach for explaining how organizations use rationalized formal structures and 
corresponding policies to adapt to institutionalized prescriptions emanating from their 
environments. Slowly but surely, the corpus of neo-institutional empirical studies 
begins to present a serious challenge to earlier work by scholars like Blau (1970), 
Thompson (1967), and Woodward (1965). These students of organization were 
schooled in the Weberian tradition, but followed him only partially in that they saw 
bureaucratization primarily as a rational response to complexity-increasing factors 
like organizational size and technology. In their work, the spread of bureaucratic 
structures is explained by pointing at their superior abilities for imposing coordination 
and control on a complex world. 
A response came from Meyer and Rowan (1977), who did not discard the role 
of rationality in organizational design altogether, but also pointed at an alternative 
Weberian source of formal structure: the legitimacy of rationalized formal structures 
and policies. In ‘modern’ societies, bureaucratic principles are no longer a purely 
rational response to underlying problems of coordination and control. These 
principles have become significant institutions unto themselves: sets of prescriptions 
that are so much seen as definitional characteristics of modern organizations that 
arrangements lacking these principles are bound to be perceived as incomplete, 
imperfect, and thus illegitimate. According to Meyer and Rowan, bureaucratic 
principles are now often mindlessly “enforced by public opinion, by the views of 
important constituents, by knowledge legitimated through the educational system, by 
social prestige, by the laws, and by definitions of negligence and prudence used by the 
courts” (1977: 343), without any realistic assessment of their economic rationality. 
 3
 A highly influential paper by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) subsequently gave 
a major impetus to institutional scholarship. At the core of this paper lies the 
observation that “highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which 
individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the 
aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” (p. 147). This observation 
not only stimulated many new empirical studies; it also ‘standardized’ them in two 
important ways. First, increased population-level homogeneity, or isomorphism (cf. 
Hawley, 1968), quickly became the default dependent variable for neo-
institutionalists. Second, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) did not leave the likely 
antecedents of isomorphism unspecified, but rather stipulated three broad processes 
through which interorganizational homogeneity could be produced: coercion by 
powerful actors, mimetism in the face of systemic uncertainty, and normative 
imbuement by the professions. Soon after the publication of their work, this 
combination of a compelling dependent variable and intuitively appealing antecedent 
factors began to show up in the form of research hypotheses in many empirical studies 
(Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). The upshot of this two-sided standardization process is that 
the neo-institutional corpus of empirical work is presently more structured than most 
other subfields in organization studies, which makes it considerably easier to compare 
and aggregate research findings. An abundance of narrative reviews testifies to this 
effect (cf. Scott, 1987, 2001; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Palmer & Biggart, 2002).  
 In this light, it is interesting to note that, to the best of our knowledge, no prior 
attempt has been made to quantitatively synthesize and assess the work on neo-
institutionalism with the help of meta-analytical techniques. Such an effort would 
contribute to the present state of theorizing in a number of ways. First, whereas 
narrative reviews are important because they organize past research findings and 
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guide future research efforts, they lack inferential power. In the absence of 
quantitative integration, it is impossible to come to a full understanding of the relative 
effect of the various isomorphic processes on the social production of 
interorganizational homogeneity. Second, both the notion of isomorphism and its 
antecedent processes defy straightforward operationalization due to their multifaceted 
nature. A meta-analysis can shed new light on previously unexplored contingency 
factors by assessing the strength of the proposed relationships at the sub-construct and 
indicator levels of analysis. Third, strategy scholars have long recognized neo-
institutionalism as an important addition to their theoretical repertoires (e.g., 
Deephouse, 1999). Due to their preoccupation with explaining corporate performance, 
a significant number of studies is now available for meta-analytical synthesis which 
test the relationship between the isomorphic enactment of rational myths and 
organizational success. Significantly, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 352-353) already 
alluded to the existence and importance of this relationship. Through our meta-
analysis, we aim to contribute towards each of these three objectives. 
Before proceeding, it must be acknowledged that there is no singular 
institutional approach to organization studies. No less than three complementary 
institutional approaches coexist to the present date. First, there is the ‘old’ 
institutionalism, closely associated with the work of Selznick (1949, 1957) and 
focused on how organizations become institutions themselves, in the sense of 
becoming “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” 
(Selznick, 1957: 17). The second approach is also known as the ‘new’ 
institutionalism, and is mostly concerned with how organizations are influenced by 
institutionalized rules and environments (for reviews of the difference between the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalisms, see: DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood & 
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Hinings, 1996; Selznick, 1996). The third approach recently emerged in response to 
critics, who have accused the ‘new’ institutionalists of painting a picture of a 
Huxleyean Brave New World (Hirsch, 1997), in which the only behavioral option 
open to organizations is complying with prevailing prescriptions. This latest stream 
recognizes the importance of agency and interest in institutional processes, and seeks 
to incorporate issues like power, entrepreneurship, and strategic responsiveness in 
institutional theorizing (see Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, for a review). Here, we 
exclusively focus our efforts on providing a quantitative synthesis of the ‘new’ 
institutionalism. The other two approaches simply do not lend themselves for a meta-
analysis yet, either because the main mode of empirical inquiry has historically been 
the qualitative case study (the ‘old’ institutionalism) or because its relative youth has 
prevented it thus far from producing a sufficient number of quantitative studies to 
warrant a synthesis (‘agency and interest’ institutionalism). 
 
NEO-INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESES 
 
The central question of neo-institutional theory is straightforward: “What makes 
organizations so similar?” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 147). Characteristic for neo-
institutionalists is that in addressing this question they primarily point at social rather 
than technical factors. In sharp contrast to neo-classical economic theories and the 
offspring they spawned in the field of organization studies – such as the resource-
based and industry structure views of economic competition – neo-institutionalists do 
not see organizations as atomistic value-maximizing actors. Rather, they treat them as 
social acceptance-seeking actors, which are embedded in organizational fields. By the 
latter concept, neo-institutionalists “mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
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constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services 
or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). 
It should be clear from the onset that the field concept is considerably broader 
in scope than the related concepts of ‘industry’ and ‘sector,’ which occupy a central 
role in the aforementioned neoclassical economic theories of competition. The virtue 
of this broader unit of analysis is that it allows for the identification of two distinct 
sources of isomorphism: competitive and institutional (Fennell, 1980; Meyer, 1979). 
The former type results from the disciplining force of economic competition. Certain 
features are likely to diffuse throughout a population of organizations when they make 
organizations more efficient, for example because they help organizations reduce 
waste or lower transaction costs (cf. Williamson, 1985). The field concept is not 
strictly necessary for the analysis of competitive isomorphism, as the more confined 
industry or sector concepts suffice to model it. The latter type of isomorphism, 
however, results from the rationalized expectations of a much broader group of 
organizational constituents. Under this conception, features diffuse throughout a 
population of organizations when they help make organizations more legitimate, in 
the sense of being seen as appropriate or desirable against some preexisting 
background schema of societal norms, beliefs, and expectations (cf. Suchman, 1995). 
We need the broader field concept to understand institutional isomorphism, as the 
narrower industry and sector concepts are not equipped to grasp the consequences of 
organizations’ exposure to non-competitive isomorphic pressures. As stated in the 
introduction, neo-institutionalists generally consider three such pressures: coercive, 
mimetic, and normative pressures. 
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Coercive Pressures.  
 
Coercive isomorphism “results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organizations function” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983: 150). In empirical work, coercive pressures are typically 
operationalized in two ways. First, the generic term ‘dependence’ in the above 
definition is commonly taken to mean resource dependence – organizations’ reliance 
on resources controlled by formally independent others (cf. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
– even though the latter concept is considerably narrower in scope. Resource 
dependencies might lead to isomorphism when resource-controlling parties only make 
their resources available to parties that have adopted features they deem desirable 
(Teo, Wei, & Benbasat, 2003; Bridges & Villemez, 1991). Second, the most dominant 
cultural expectations in modern societies are those supported and upheld by the legal 
system (cf. Weber, 1978), and neo-institutionalists therefore also often operationalize 
coercive pressure as the imposition of organizational rules and structures through 
government mandate. Legislation can breed isomorphism when the legislator puts a 
penalty on organizational deviance from legal rules (Mezias, 1990; Provan, 1987). 
Both factors are used jointly or in isolation in many empirical studies to test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The degree of coercive pressure in an organizational field is 
positively related to the degree of interorganizational homogeneity in that 
field. 
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Mimetic Pressures.  
 
A second potential source of isomorphism is uncertainty, which arises from the use of 
complex technologies (March & Olsen, 1976), difficult to decipher means-ends 
relationships (Levitt & March, 1988), ambiguous or contested goals (Thompson, 
1967), or symbolic noise emanating from the organizational environment (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). In times of uncertainty, organizations may ‘minimize future regret’ or 
‘hedge their bets’ by modeling their features after those of selected focal entities in 
the organizational field. This may happen unintentionally, due to factors like 
employee transfer and turnover, or deliberately, such as when managers hire 
consultants to ‘benchmark’ their performance and business models against those of 
competitors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In both cases, collective mimicking of a few 
successful entities in a field will lead to increased homogenization. Haunschild and 
Miner (1997) have introduced a three-pronged typology of criteria used by mimicking 
organizations to select their role models. Organizations may imitate practices because 
they have previously been adopted by a subset of very large or generally successful 
role models (trait-based imitation), by large numbers of other organizations 
(frequency-based imitation), or because these practices are believed to have produced 
positive outcomes for others (outcome-based imitation). We use this typology here 
because it offers an excellent coverage of the many empirical studies that have 
appeared on the topic of mimetic isomorphism (cf. Mizruchi & Fein, 1998). Virtually 
all published studies rely on one or several of these forms of imitation to test the 
following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2. The degree of mimetic pressure in an organizational field is 
positively related to the degree of interorganizational homogeneity in that 
field. 
 
Normative Pressures.  
 
A third source of isomorphic change derives from the professionalization of 
organizational fields and is normative in kind. DiMaggio and Powell define 
professionalization as “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define 
the conditions and methods of their work” (1983: 152). Professional norms and 
prescriptions are often eagerly pursued by organization members, because 
professional recognition is associated with higher occupational prestige, greater job 
autonomy, and often better remuneration. The reason that professionalization is 
associated with homogenization is that professions themselves thrive on the 
standardization of knowledge, procedures, and outputs (Empson, 2006). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) consider two important routes for the diffusion of professional 
norms throughout organizational fields. One is through the recruitment of similarly 
trained and socialized university specialists (Hong & Karlsson, 2004; Mezias, 1990). 
As these graduates rise through the organizational ranks, they slowly but surely infuse 
the organization with the professional norms they were taught at their alma maters. 
Another, much faster route is through the growth and elaboration of professional 
networks (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Lee & Pennings, 2002). As top managers 
interact with their peers, either directly via structures like board interlocks or 
indirectly through third-party linking mechanisms like trade associations, they get into 
direct contact with extant and emerging professional norms. In turn, these derive their 
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normative force from shared standards of collegiality and appropriateness (Cyert & 
March, 1963). Both formal education (‘credentials’) and professional association 
(‘networks’) are widely used in empirical studies to test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The degree of normative pressure in an organizational field is 
positively related to the degree of interorganizational homogeneity in that 
field. 
 
Corporate Performance 
 
Neo-institutional theory is not only used to explain isomorphism. Over the last 
decade, the theory has increasingly been used by strategic management scholars to 
explain performance differentials between organizations. In their accounts, 
organizations that comply with field-level norms can count on positive performance 
effects when their isomorphic tendencies are interpreted by resource-controlling third 
parties as credible signs that they are deserving of their support. These efforts by no 
means stretch the theory beyond its justifiable scope of application. As Meyer and 
Rowan already pointed out: “Organizations that incorporate societally legitimated 
rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and 
increase their resources and survival capabilities” (1977: 352). In other words, 
interorganizational isomorphism may yield competitive advantages for focal firms. 
Two such advantages are commonly identified in the empirical literature. First, 
isomorphism may allow organizations to gain symbolic benefits like public 
endorsement and better reputation scores (cf. Deephouse, 1996; Staw & Epstein, 
2000; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). Even though these benefits are largely 
 11
intangible, they are real in terms of their consequences, as they provide organizations 
with a societal ‘license to operate’ without which they could not persist. Second, 
adhering to societally rationalized structures can directly shed substantive benefits on 
organizations such as lower compliance costs and higher stock market evaluations 
(Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Both types 
of performance indicators are commonly used to test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The adoption of societally legitimated rationalized elements by 
focal organizations is positively related to the performance of those 
organizations. 
 
EXPLORATORY MODERATOR ANALYSES 
 
We conducted two exploratory moderator analyses in addition to testing the above 
hypotheses. First, we explored different operationalizations of variables across the 
various studies included in our meta-analysis. For Hypotheses 1 – 3, we assessed 
whether differential operationalizations of the independent variables in the individual 
studies in our meta-analysis resulted in differences in terms of associational strength 
or even directionality in their relationships with the dependent variables. Thus, for the 
hypothesized effect of coercive pressures on isomorphism we tested resource 
dependence versus legislative influence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); for differential 
isomorphic effects amongst mimetic pressures we tested trait-based versus frequency-
based versus outcome-based imitation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997); and for 
differential normative effects we tested credentials versus networks (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). For Hypothesis 4, we tested whether the predicted relationship was 
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different in terms of associational strength or directionality for both 
operationalizations of the dependent variable. We thus tested symbolic versus 
substantive benefits. 
 Second, we tested whether the following ten study characteristics had a 
moderating effect on any of the hypothesized focal relationships: (1) publication 
status (published versus unpublished), (2) year of publication, (3) publication outlet 
(Academy of Management Journal, American Sociological Review, American Journal 
of Sociology, Administrative Science Quarterly, or other), (4) study design (cross-
sectional versus longitudinal), (5) organization type (private versus public), (6) sector 
(healthcare, financial services, media, educational services, or other), and (7) home 
country (US or other). As we had no a-priori intuitions concerning the effect of the 
moderators on our focal relationships, we offer no directional hypotheses for them. 
 
METHODS 
 
Literature Search 
 
We used four complementary literature retrieval procedures to minimize the odds of 
“missing a useful paper that lies outside one’s regular purview” (White, 1994: 44). To 
identify appropriate studies (articles, book chapters, dissertations, and working 
papers), we first examined three computerized databases: ABI/INFORM Global, 
EconLit, and JSTOR.1 Second, we conducted manual searches, from 1983 (the year in 
which DiMaggio and Powell published their influential article) to 2006, of the five 
journals that yielded most articles during the first step: Academy of Management 
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, American Sociological Review, 
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Organization Science, and American Journal of Sociology. Third, we used a two-way 
‘snowballing’ technique by backward-tracing all references reported in the articles in 
the initial set, and by forward-tracing all articles that cited the original articles using 
Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. As a fourth and final step, we searched 
for unpublished studies by corresponding with 53 researchers in the area directly and 
by sending out an e-mail message via OMT-L, an electronic communication medium 
maintained by the Organization and Management Theory Division of the Academy of 
Management. This yielded 12 additional responses. 
 We used two heuristics to determine which studies to include in the meta-
analysis (cf. Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). First, a study had to report relationships 
between isomorphism on the one hand and one or more of the aforementioned 
operationalizations of coercive pressure, mimetic pressure, normative pressure, and 
corporate performance on the other. Table 1 summarizes definitions for our core 
constructs and their common operationalizations. Second, a study had to report 
sample sizes as well as an outcome statistic (e.g., r, univariate F, t, χ2) that allows for 
the computation of a usable effect size (Hunter & Schmidt, 1994; Rosenthal, 1994). 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 We proceeded by reading all articles in the final set and by developing a 
coding protocol (cf. Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for extracting data on all relevant 
variables.2 Specifically, we collected effect sizes, sample sizes, statistical artifacts, 
and study characteristics. One of the authors coded the primary studies. The coding 
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task involved both calculation-based coding (e.g., coding effect sizes, sample sizes, 
and reliabilities of empirical measures) and judgment-based coding (e.g., assigning 
specific operationalizations of variables in the primary studies to generic construct 
categories). All judgment-based codes were rechecked by the other author. Where 
initial disagreement existed, we used dialogue to reach a joint coding decision.  
 
Data Set 
 
Nonindependence. Stochastic dependencies among effect sizes may influence 
average effect estimates and their precision (Matt & Cook, 1994). We relied on two 
separate measures to ensure a reasonable degree of independence amongst the effect 
sizes in our sample. First, when multiple independent samples were presented in a 
study, we included correlations from both samples. Second, when multiple 
correlations for a single relationship were presented which were based on a single 
sample (as occurs when multiple operationalizations are presented of a single 
underlying construct), we combined these correlations into a linear composite 
correlation using formulas provided by Schmidt and Le (2004; also see Hunter & 
Schmidt, 1990: 457-460). The corresponding reliability scores were calculated using 
the Mosier formula (Schmidt & Le, 2004; cf. Hunter & Schmidt, 1990: 461). 
Outliers and sample. To detect and correct for outliers we followed the 
Windsorizing approach suggested by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). This procedure is 
used when “extreme values are believed to be unrepresentative or spurious, but the 
analyst does not wish to lose the data they represent” (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001: 108). 
Effect sizes that were more than 2.5 standard deviations removed from the mean 
correlation for a given hypothesized relationship were brought back to this cut-off 
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point. In all, 8 effect sizes were recoded. We also checked the robustness of our 
findings against alternative cutoff points of 2.0 and 3.0 standard deviations, but 
neither value significantly affected the results of the subsequent meta-analyses. The 
final data sample consisted of 234 effect sizes from 51 studies, of which 4 were 
unpublished when we conducted our meta-analysis. 
 
Meta-Analytic Calculations 
 
Every primary study is hampered by imperfections in research methods (‘artifacts’). A 
great advantage of quantitative research synthesis is that it allows us to correct for 
these artifacts, such that we can maximize the relevance of our estimates to the testing 
and evaluation of scientific theories (Hunter & Schmidt, 1994). We used Hunter and 
Schmidt’s (2004) approach to correct the retrieved correlation coefficients (r’s) for 
the following artifacts: (1) sampling error, (2) measurement error in the dependent 
variable, (3) measurement error in the independent variable, (4) dichotomization of a 
continuous dependent variable, (5) dichotomization of a continuous independent 
variable, and (6) downward bias in the retrieved correlation coefficient as a measure 
of the population correction. As information on some of these artifacts was not widely 
reported, we based our meta-analysis on artifact distributions rather than individually 
corrected correlation coefficients.  
 The resulting artifact-corrected meta-analyses yielded the following summary 
statistics: (1) total number of correlations (k), (2) total sample size (N), (3) the 
average corrected correlation (mean ρ), (4) the associated standard deviation of the 
corrected correlations in the population (SDρ), (5) the 80% credibility interval around 
the mean rho (CrImean ρ), (6) the 90% confidence interval around the mean rho (CImean 
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ρ), (7) the true residual variance in the observed correlations after removal of variance 
due to artifacts (SDres), and (8) and the percentage of variance accounted for by all 
study artifacts. The distinction in meta-analysis between credibility intervals and 
confidence intervals is important (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). The credibility interval 
refers to the distribution of parameter values, implying that at the chosen level of 
inclusion 80% of the values of the rho distribution lie in this interval. Credibility 
values are independent of sampling error, as these have been removed from the 
estimate of SDρ Confidence intervals, alternatively, express the likely amount of error 
in the estimate of mean ρ due to sampling error. At the chosen confidence level, we 
can be 95% certain that the true mean effect size lies within this interval.  
 To assess whether all individual correlations reported in our primary studies 
were drawn from the same population (in which case further moderator analysis 
would be unnecessary), we relied on Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) 75% rule-of-
thumb. The rule states that an additional search for moderators is warranted when less 
than 75% of the observed variance in correlations is explained by study artifacts. 
Since the levels of variance accounted for by artifacts are all well below the 75% cut-
off point in our analyses, the underlying correlations are apparently drawn from 
different populations. Further moderator analysis is therefore warranted. To establish 
the extent to which our findings were influenced by publication bias, we conducted a 
vote count of the findings of the studies included in our analysis. Publication bias is 
assumed to be present when published studies report significantly more positive and 
less insignificant or counter-hypothesized outcomes than unpublished work (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000). We found that 60% of all tests in the published studies reported 
confirmatory results, whereas 6% found counter-hypothesized results. For 
unpublished studies the percentages were both slightly lower at 55% and 4% 
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respectively. Publication bias thus does not seem to be having a major effect on our 
findings. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Testing Neo-Institutional Hypotheses 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our respective meta-analyses. Hypothesis 
1 was supported, albeit with an important qualification. The mean ρ of the 
relationship between coercive pressures and isomorphism was .07 (based on 56 effect 
sizes) and the 95% confidence interval was small and did not include zero. This 
implies that the relationship between both constructs is statistically significant. The 
credibility interval, however, did include zero, which means that the hypothesized 
effect was not fully generalizable across all primary studies included in the analysis. 
Further moderator analyses are thus needed to understand the conditions determining 
the influence of institutional forces. The results further showed that both resource 
dependence and state influence were significant predictors of isomorphism, as 
evidenced by their all-positive confidence intervals. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Hypothesis 2 was fully supported without further qualifications. The mean ρ of 
the association between mimetic pressures and isomorphism was .09, the confidence 
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interval was small and did not include zero, and the credibility interval likewise was 
all-positive. This implies a statistically significant relationship, which is furthermore 
generalizable across the set of primary studies included in the analysis. Interestingly, 
this effect is strongly driven by the effect of frequency-based imitation, as both trait-
based imitation and outcome-based imitation evidenced weaker relationships with 
isomorphism. Also noteworthy is that these results were based on 89 effect sizes, 
which is the highest number for any of the isomorphic pressures. This suggests prior 
observations on the disproportionately high degree of attention paid by neo-
institutional researchers to mimetic effects (cf. Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). 
 Hypothesis 3 was supported, but again with an important qualification. The 
mean ρ between normative pressures and isomorphism was .10 (based on 39 effect 
sizes), and the confidence interval was reasonably small and all-positive. Thus, the 
relationship between both constructs is statistically significant. The credibility 
interval, however, did include zero, implying that our results could not be generalized 
across all primary studies included in the analysis. Further moderator analysis is 
necessary to explore why. Interestingly, the results for normative isomorphism appear 
to be driven somewhat by the normative force of credentials, and only to a lesser 
extent by network effects. Thus, even though networks allow for faster diffusion of 
rationalized legitimated practices, the result of formal training and certifications on 
their adoption appears more profound. 
 Neo-institutional theory is also worth its salt as a strategic management theory, 
as is demonstrated by the support for Hypothesis 4. The mean ρ for the relationship 
between isomorphism and benefits is .23 (based on 50 effect sizes) and the confidence 
interval does not include zero. Some caution is appropriate, however, since the 
credibility interval is not all-positive. Additional moderator analysis is called for, as 
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the overall results are not generalizable across all studies in our sample. Noteworthy is 
also that the effect of isomorphism on symbolic benefits is greater than its effect of 
substantive benefits, and that the result for symbolic benefits is also better 
generalizable than its substantive counterpart.  
 
Moderator Analysis 
 
Both the Hunter and Schmidt (1990) 75% rule-of-thumb and the relatively large 
credibility intervals around the mean ρ’s for our hypothesized relationships suggest 
that the effect sizes in our sample are heterogeneously distributed, and thus that 
further moderator analyses are warranted. We rely on a modified weighted least 
squares (WLS) regression analysis to assess the relationship between effect size and 
moderator variables (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We assume that the variance beyond 
subject-level sampling error is derived partly from systematic, identifiable factors, and 
partly from random sources. In this case, so-called mixed effects models are most 
appropriately applied (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Such models act in part like fixed 
effects models, in that they assume that certain identifiable study characteristics will 
act as moderator variables, in that they are associated with and will in part account for 
systematic differences among effect sizes. Unlike fixed effect models, however, they 
also allow for a random component of residual variance to remain after the systematic 
part is accounted for.  
In the WLS regression, effect sizes are used as the dependent variable, the 
identified moderators as independent variables, and the inverse variance weights as 
the weighting variable. Although regular WLS regression analysis tends to fit the 
model correctly and will provide accurate regression coefficients, betas, and R2, the 
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standard errors must be adjusted to be correct and to provide accurate assessments of 
statistical significance. We made these adjustments using procedures suggested by 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001). The overall level of heterogeneity in the sample is given 
by the homogeneity statistic Q. As stated, Q has two components, a component 
captured by the model (Qm) and a residual component (Qr). In the adjusted WLS 
regression we applied, the random effects variance component is estimated by means 
of a method of moments-based estimation procedure after the moderator variables 
have been accounted for. Results for the WLS regressions are presented in Tables 3 
and 4.  
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
We estimated separate models for methodological moderators (publication 
status, year of publication, publication outlet, and study design) and for substantive 
moderators (organization type, sector, and home country; see Table 4). Moderator 
analysis for the relationship between isomorphic pressures and isomorphism showed 
that year of publication and study design are positively associated with the effect size. 
The former effect may be indicative of an increasing self-justificatory bias in the 
literature: as the theory becomes more established over the years, studies that find no 
support for the theory or even counter-hypothesized effects will become more 
difficult to publish. The latter effect shows that cross-sectional studies tend to publish 
greater effect sizes than longitudinal studies. This finding lends credence to emerging 
notions in the institutional change literature that isomorphic tendencies may represent 
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episodic rather than continuous aspects of the history of institutional fields 
(Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). Organizations may thus come to resemble one 
another more and more during certain periods, only to diverge again in later periods. 
Finally, for the methodological model, the component of residual variance, Qr, is non-
significant, suggesting no further presence of moderators. 
In the substantive model, all variables except for financial services have a 
significant moderating effect on the relationship between isomorphic pressures and 
isomorphism (see Table 4). The fact that the ‘private organization’ variable negatively 
moderated the predicted relationship supports the intuitively appealing idea that 
public organizations are subjected to greater isomorphic pressures, and comply with 
them more often. Of the sector variables, only ‘media’ positively moderates the 
hypothesized relationship. This may point at several factors, including the importance 
of cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) for media organizations, the relative ease of 
mimicking media formats, and the degree of control the state still wishes to exert over 
media organizations in many nations. Finally, the US variable negative moderated the 
focal relationship. This is slightly paradoxical, as isomorphic pressures are nowhere 
studied with greater vigor than in the US, whereas they are de facto stronger in other 
regions. By and large, this reinforces an existing image of the US as a relatively 
liberal country amongst the more advanced nations in the world. Finally, for the 
substantive model, the component of residual variance, Qr, is non-significant, 
suggesting no further presence of moderators. 
For the hypothesized relationship between isomorphism and performance, no 
significant moderator variables were identified, neither in the methodological nor in 
the substantive models. Furthermore, the component of residual variance, Qr, is non-
significant for both models, suggesting no further presence of undetected moderators. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Contributions 
 
Since 1983 numerous studies have investigated the relationship between isomorphic 
pressures and increased homogeneity between organizations and its subsequent 
effects on efficiency and benefits. This meta-analysis has contributed to neo-
institutional literature in a number of ways. First, this is the first-ever quantitative 
review of more than 50 articles resulting in 234 correlations, allowing for inferences 
on the above described relationship using a comprehensive model. It showed that 
there is indeed increased homogeneity due to isomorphic pressures. Second, as 
indicated by Mizruchi and Fein (1999), we found that mimetic isomorphism is still 
most commonly used indicator to test homogeneity hypotheses. Moreover, the 
strength of the relationship between mimetism and isomorphism was greater than that 
of either coercive or normative pressures. This could be the result of latent publication 
bias, implying that since these relationships are more often found to be significant, 
they will also be published more often. It is therefore not surprising that we found the 
greatest number of effect sizes for this type of isomorphic pressure. Third, as 
proposed by the literature, increased isomorphism leads to symbolic benefits to be 
bestowed on the focal organization whereas the hypotheses on substantive benefits 
received mixed support. This finding supports earlier insights on the importance of 
isomorphic conformity raised by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan 
(1977). 
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Limitations and Future Research Implications 
 
Like any study, ours has its limitations. First, although we have tried to be 
comprehensive in our search for articles, we most likely missed out on several studies 
that somehow went below the radar. Moreover, although several unpublished drafts 
and working papers are included in our analysis, more are likely to exist. Future meta-
analyses of neo-institutional theory could be strengthened by including more 
unpublished work. Another limitation is that only studies that reported effect sizes of 
the bivariate relationship between the dependent and independent variable where 
included. This limited the amount of studies applicable for the research, as most (!) 
articles did not report a correlation table or only reported correlations amongst the 
independent variables. This holds particularly true for the sociology journals, even the 
major ones. This practice, although common, is lamentable as it stands in the way of 
better research synthesis and the project of cumulative scientific insight more 
generally. We therefore urge the other major journals in our field to follow the lead of 
publications like the Academy of Management Journal, and make the publication of 
full correlation tables mandatory.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Neo-institutional theory is well established in the organizational literature and, as our 
meta-analysis shows, goes empirically supported. Yet, it still struggles with the 
question as to how universal its applicability really is. Future research is needed on 
this issue, in order to secure not only a glorious past but also a bright future for neo-
institutional theory. 
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 TABLE 1 
Definitions of the Neo-Institutional Constructs and Representative Measures 
Construct  Definition and measures 
Coercive pressures Construct definition: pressures that results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations 
upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society in which organizations function 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Representative measures: see resource dependence and legislative influence 
 
o Resource dependence Construct definition: the extent to which the focal organization depends on constituents in its environment for 
critical resources (e.g. production input but also legitimacy), that allow these external parties to exercise 
influence over said focal organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Representative measure: Teo, Wei and Benbasat (2003) & Bridges and Villemez (1991) 
 
o Legislative Influence Construct definition: imposition of standard operating procedures and legitimated rules and structures through 
government mandate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Representative measures: Mezias (1990) & Provan (1987) 
 
Mimetic pressures Construct definition: the modeling of the focal organizations after other organizations in the field when faced 
with uncertainty over goals, technologies symbolism etc (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)\. 
Representative measures: see trait-based, frequency-based and outcome-based imitation. 
 
o Trait-based imitation Construct definition: imitation of practices that have been used by some subset of organizations selected on 
the basis of organizational characteristics such as perceived successfulness or size (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). 
Representative measures: Kraatz (1998) & Haunschild and Miner (1997). 
 
o Frequency-based 
imitation 
Construct definition: imitation of actions that have been taken by large numbers of other organizations 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
Representative measures: Kraatz (1998) & Haunschild and Miner (1997) 
 
o Outcome-based 
imitation 
Construct definition: imitation of actions that produced positive outcomes for others (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997) 
Representative measure: Teo, Wei and Benbasat (2003)  Haunschild and Miner (1997). 
 
Normative pressures Construct definition: the collective struggle of members to define the conditions and methods of their work. 
Representative measures: see credentials and networks. 
 
o Credentials Construct definition: professionalization through a cognitive base created through formal education of 
university specialists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Representative measures: Mezias (1990) and Hong and Karlsson (2004). 
 
o Networks Construct definition: growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations that allow for 
new models to diffuse rapidly (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Representative measures: Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) and Lee and Pennings (2002). 
 
Isomorphism Construct definition: a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley as cited in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Representative measures: D’Aunno, Succi and Alexander (2000) & Lee and Pennings (2002). 
 
Corporate performance Construct definition: the increase in resources, customers, political power and institutional legitimacy due to 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Representative measures: see symbolic benefits and substantive benefits. 
 
o Symbolic benefits Construct definition: the bestowal of symbolic resources such as public endorsement and better reputation 
scores (Heugens and Lamertz, forthcoming). 
Representative measures: Deephouse (1996) & Deephouse and Carter (2005). 
 
o Substantive benefits Construct definition: possible efficiency and performance benefits accruing from isomorphic adaptation of 
strategies or structures. 
Representative measures: Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) Westphal, Gulati and Shortell (1997). 
 
 25
 TABLE 2 
Meta-Analytic Results for the Focal Relationshipsa
 
 
Predictor 
 
 
k 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
ρ 
 
SDρ
 
CrImean 
ρ 80%   
 
CImean 
ρ  
95% 
 
SDres
% 
Variance 
accounted 
for 
         
Coercive pressures to 
isomorphism 
56 92091 .0701 .1795 -.1597 
- 
.2998 
.0524 
- 
.0877 
.0225 2.7 
Coercive pressures to 
strategic isomorphism 
42 31291 .1612 .2556 -.1661 
- .4884 
.1143 
- 
.2081 
.0436 3.3 
Coercive pressures to 
structural isomorphism 
14 60809 .0220 .0909 -.0944 
- .1383 
.0117 
- 
.0322 
.0076 2.9 
Resource dependence 
to strategic 
isomorphism 
29 18433 .2117 .2451 -.1021 
- .553 
.1521 
- 
.3014 
.0437 3.5 
Resource dependence 
to structural 
isomorphism 
8 16840 .0020 .1248 -.1578 
- .1617 
.0009 
- 
.0031 
.0143 3.2 
State influence to 
strategic 
isomorphism 
13 12858 .1323 .1805 -.0987 
- .3634 
.0539 
- 
.2110 
.0158 6.9 
State Influence to 
structural 
isomorphism 
6 43960 .0239 .0542 -.0454 
- .0932 
.0032 
- 
.0447 
.0027 4.8 
         
Mimetic processes to 
isomorphism 
89 6393442 .0853 .0369 .0381 - 
.1325  
.0655 
- 
.1052 
.0010 4.0 
Mimetic processes to 
strategic isomorphism 
82 6363462 .0864 .0419 .0328 - 
.1400 
.0656 
- 
.1073 
.0013 3.5 
Mimetic processes to 
structural isomorphism 
7 32942 .0901 .1029 -.0415 
- .2218 
.0077 
- 
.1725 
.0096 2.1 
Trait-based imitation 
to strategic 
isomorphism 
28 122288 .0670 .0587 -0081 - 
.1421 
.0300 
- 
.1040 
.0021 10.3 
Trait-based imitation 
to structural 
isomorphism 
4 9584 .1880 .1492 -.0030 
- .3789 
-.0172 
- 
.3931 
.0203 1.9 
Frequency-based 
imitation to strategic 
isomorphism 
44 6173877 .0811 .0323 .0398 – 
1222 
.0607 
- 
.1015 
.0009 0.8 
Frequency-based 
imitation to structural 
isomorphism 
1 # # # # # # # 
Outcome-based 
imitation to strategic 
10 64335 .0074 .0861 -.0919 
- .1285 
.0048 
- 
.0063 2.4 
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 isomorphism .0318 
Outcome-based 
imitation to structural 
isomorphism 
2 # # # # # # # 
         
Normative pressures to 
isomorphism 
39 64572 .0960 .1454 -.0901 
- .2821 
.0681 
- 
.1240 
.0151 4.1 
Normative  pressures to 
strategic isomorphism 
35 40594 .1123 .1946 -.1368 
.3613 
.0782 
- 
.1463 
.0257 3.5 
Normative pressures to 
structural isomorphism 
4 23978 .0725 .0831 -.0337 
- .1789 
-.0119 
- 
.1570 
.0063 2.6 
Credentials to 
strategic 
isomorphism 
7 3991 .3118 .2567 -.0168 
- .6404 
.0913 
- 
.5322 
.0553 2.6 
Credentials to 
structural 
isomorphism 
0 # # # # # # # 
Networks to strategic 
isomorphism 
28 36603 .0798 .1310 -.0877 
- .2472 
.0530 
- 
.1066 
.0121 6.2 
Networks to 
structural 
isomorphism 
4 23978 .0725 .0831 -.3378 
- .1789 
-.0120 
- 
.1570 
.0063 2.6 
         
Isomorphism to benefits 50 31837 .2327 .2737 -.1176 
- .5830 
.1514 
- 
.3140 
.0444 3.3 
Isomorphism to 
substantive 
effectiveness 
34 26629 .2419 .3049 -.1483 
- .6322 
.1044 
- 
.3795 
.0519 2.3 
Isomorphism to 
symbolic benefits 
16 4059 .1847 .0744 .0895 - 
.2800 
.1357 
- 
.2337 
.0055 40.3 
a  k = number of data points; N = total sample size; Mean ρ = estimate of the corrected population 
correlation; SDρ = estimated standard deviation of the corrected correlations in the population; CrImean ρ 
80% = 80% credibility interval for the distribution of parameters values; CImean ρ 95% =  95% 
confidence interval for mean rho; SDres = residual standard deviation; % Variance accounted for = 
percentage of observed variance accounted for by statistical artifacts. 
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 TABLE 3 
 Moderator Analysis Isomorphic Pressures to Isomorphisma
Variable Methodological Model Substantive Model 
AMJ .0022 (.0479)  
ASQ .0346 (.0545)  
ASR -.0150 (.0738)  
AJS .0809 (.0750)  
PUBYEAR .0073 (.0037)*  
CROSS .1065 (.0410)**  
PRIVATE  -.0511 (.0404)** 
FINANCIAL  -.0511 (.0363) 
CARE  -.1209 (.0508)* 
MEDIA  .4173 (.0465)** 
EDUCATION  -.1398 (.0465)** 
US  -.0855 (.0292)** 
   
R2 .0720 .2582 
Significance .0379 .0000 
QRES 171.9294 189.7415 
 a   *    p < .05 
 **  p < .01 
 
 
 28
 TABLE 4 
Moderator Analysis Isomorphism to Performancea
Variable Methodological Model Substantive Model 
AMJ .0711 (.0788)  
ASQ -.0730 (.0721)  
PUBYEAR .0020 (.0057)  
CROSS .0133 (.0583)  
PRIVATE  .1053 (.0799) 
FINANCIAL  -.0126 (.0735) 
CARE  -.0230 (.0556) 
US  .1771 (.0945) 
   
R2 .1688 .1063 
SIGN .0675 .2439 
QRES 43.1144 45.8258 
                   a   *    p < .05 
       **  p < .01 
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 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Our searches always included one substantive and one methodological keyword (cf. David & Han, 
2004; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 2006). The substantive keywords we used were: 
‘isomorphism,’ ‘mimetic isomorphism,’ ‘coercive isomorphism,’ ‘normative isomorphism,’ ‘mimetic 
processes,’ ‘normative pressures,’ ‘institutional theory,’ ‘rationalization,’ ‘decoupling,’ ‘rational 
myths,’ ‘substantive effectiveness,’ ‘symbolic endorsement,’ and ‘institutional isomorphism.’ The 
methodological keyword we used were: ‘data,’ ‘methodology,’ ‘correlations,’ and ‘sample.’ 
2 The coding protocol is available from the authors upon request. 
3 References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the meta-analyses. 
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